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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

Whether the district court erred in dismissing the City
of Northwood's request for an order to the Department
of the Interior to perform a natural resource damage assessment to recover damages from Multi-Chem Chemical Company, under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)?

II.

Whether the district court erred in dismissing the City
of Northwood's CERCLA action for natural resource
damages against Multi-Chem Chemical Company?
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STATEMENT OF CASE
The City of Northwood is the home of the Northwood
National Wildlife Refuge. The City's municipal boundaries
completely enclose the refuge. Although the refuge is federally
owned, it plays an integral part in the lives of the people of
Northwood. The refuge makes Northwood an attractive place
to live because each autumn and spring thousands of birds,
represented by many different species, pass through the refuge on their journey from Canada to the tropics. Indeed, the
City's slogan is "Northwood: We're for the Birds." The refuge
also provides the people of Northwood with a recreational facility as bird watching, hiking, and biking trails are found
within its boundaries. Finally, the refuge serves as a visual
and noise buffer for Northwood because it physically separates the City from a busy highway system. However, the relationship between the refuge and Northwood is one of reciprocity. The refuge is serviced by the City's utilities, including
fire protection and trash removal.
In 1984, the City of Northwood Health Department discovered the existence of "hazardous substances" (under federal law) in the well water of homes located near the MultiChem Chemical Company ("Multi-Chem"). The hazardous
substances were Multi-Chem pesticide ingredients and the
contaminated wells were all located downstream from the
Multi-Chem plant. The contaminated aquifer is shallow and
the City Health Department believes that the aquifer flows
from the Multi-Chem plant underneath the homes that were
tested and onto the refuge. The Northwood Health Department also believes that the hazardous substances reach the
wetlands and marshes of the refuge; however, all parties agree
that more complete water sampling is required to determine
the extent to which the hazardous substances have reached
the surface waters of the refuge. The City remains concerned
with the quality of the present and future drinking water supply, and also with the potential long-term effects on the
refuge.
In 1989, the City brought two causes of action under The
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA). The first cause of action, a citizen
9
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suit under section 310 of CERCLA, sought to compel the Department of Interior (DOI) to perform its "nondiscretionary"
duty to assess natural resource damages and to recover for
costs of restoration from Multi-Chem. That cause of action
was dismissed by the district court for a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because the City did not allege the non-performance of a nondiscretionary duty.
In its second cause of action, the City sought to act as
"natural resource trustee" in its own right under sections
107(a)(4)(C) and 107(f) of CERCLA. The district court also
dismissed this cause of action concluding that the City is prohibited from acting as natural resource trustee under section
107(f) of CERCLA.
The City of Northwood now appeals on both causes of
action. The DOI opposes the City's appeal of the district
court's dismissal of the first cause of action and supports the
City's appeal of the dismissal of the second cause of action.
Multi-Chem opposes both appeals.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Northwood's citizen suit properly was dismissed by the
district court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because
section 107(f) of CERCLA does not impose a nondiscretionary
duty on the President to assess damage to natural resources.
Although section 107(f) provides that an official "shall" assess
damage to natural resources under his trusteeship, that language was not intended by Congress to impose a mandatory
duty. Furthermore, the DOI's interpretation that 107(f) creates only discretionary duties is controlling because that interpretation does not conflict with the intent of Congress.
Additionally, an agency decision not to take action is presumptively unreviewable by the judiciary. This presumption is
rebutted only if Congress circumscribes an agency's discretion
with specific guidelines which clearly direct the agency to act
under specific circumstances. Congress did not provide specific guidelines under CERCLA which circumscribe DOI's discretion. Accordingly, the DOI's decision not to assess damage
to the refuge is beyond the scope of judicial review.
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol7/iss2/11
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Finally, the DOI simply does not have the resources to
conduct an assessment for every allegation of damages to natural resources. The DOI's resources recently were limited severely by Congress when it prohibited the use of the
Superfund for natural resource damage assessments. The use
of citizen suits to compel action by the DOI would create a
tremendous inefficiency in the allocation of an already limited
resource. Congress did not intend such a result when it included a citizen suit provision in Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA).
CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(C) provides that generators of
hazardous wastes are liable for damages for injury to natural
resources. While the Act expressly provides that liability for
such injury is to the Federal Government and any State, the
broad remedial purpose to be accomplished by CERCLA compels courts to liberally construe its provisions. Courts must
therefore interpret the definition of state to include local governments. This result is compelled by Congress' use of the
word "includes" rather than "means" in the definition of
state. Congress' use of this term contemplates an expansion of
the definition which is necessary to accomplish the legislative
purpose behind the Act. Furthermore, Congress' inclusion of
those resources managed or controlled by local governments
in the definition of "natural resources," further supports the
proposition that local governments should be allowed to act as
resource trustees for those resources under their control.
This conclusion is further compelled by the fact that
Congress explicitly endorsed the prevailing judicial interpretation that municipalities can act as natural resource trustees by
expressly rejecting an amendment that would have prohibited
municipalities from acting as trustees. Thus leading to the inescapable conclusion that Congress intended that local governments be allowed to act as natural resource trustees.

11
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED
THE CITY'S CITIZEN SUIT FOR LACK OF SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE CITY DID
NOT ALLEGE THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR FAILED TO PERFORM A NONDISCRETIONARY DUTY UNDER CERCLA.
A.

Section 107(f) of CERCLA Does Not Require the Department of The Interior to Assess Every Allegation
of Damage to Natural Resources.

The district court ruled, inter alia, that section 107(f) of
CERCLA does not establish a mandatory duty for the President to act as natural resource trustee. Opn., at 5. The relevant portions of section 107 are as follows:
(f)(1) The President, or the authorized representative
of any State, shall act on behalf of the public as trustee
of such natural resources to recover for such
damages ....
(2)(A) Such officials shall assess damages for injury
to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources under their
trusteeship ....
CERCLA section 107(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1986) (emphasis
added). The district court's ruling should be affirmed because:
1) the legislative history of CERCLA does not indicate that
Congress intended to impose a mandatory duty on the President, 2) the DOI interprets section 107(f) as imposing a discretionary duty, and 3) the majority of case law interpreting
similar environmental statutes imposes only a discretionary
duty on the executive branch.
1. Proper statutory construction requires that language be read in its context and that courts defer
to the enforcing agency's interpretation of a
statute.
The use of the word "shall" is not dispositive on whether
a duty is intended to be mandatory. In United States v. Reeb,
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol7/iss2/11
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433 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1970), the court stated that "shall" is
not per se imperative:
"[S]hall" may sometimes be directory only, as "may" may
be mandatory .... The interpretation of these words depends upon the background circumstances and context
in which they are used and the intention of the legislativebody or administrativeagency which used them.
Id. at 383 (emphasis added). In Reeb, the court declined to
give imperative meaning to "shall" in a regulation which provided that all local draft board members "shall . . . if at all
practicable, be residents of the area in which their local board
has jurisdiction." Id. After first concluding that the board
could practicably have been comprised of residents from the
area, the court still refused to give mandatory meaning to the
regulation:
A regulation providing that board members reside in the
geographical area served by the board, "when practicable" makes sense from the standpoint of the administration . . . if this was the purpose we think it is unlikely
that the regulation was intended to be mandatory.
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the court looked beyond the
"plain meaning" of "shall" and interpreted the regulation in a
manner that made sense.
In Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the
court determined that the Attorney General was not required
to institute a civil action despite the following language:
''upon request by the Commission the Attorney General on
behalf of the United States shall institute a civil action .... "
Id. at 893 n.191. Because of the traditional discretion of the
Attorney General, the court stated that a showing that Congress intended for "shall" to be mandatory would be necessary
for "shall" to be given an imperative effect:
There is no showing in this case of a convincing legislative history that would enable us to conclude that "shall"
was intended to be "language of command." In the ab-

[5]
13
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sence of such legislative history, we are unable to agree
with Judge MacKinnon that 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(7) establishes that Congress intended to eliminate the discretion
traditionally vested in the Attorney General.
Id. (emphasis added). Like the court in Reeb, the court in
Buckley looked beyond the face value of "shall" and interpreted the statute in light of the traditional discretion of the
Attorney General. Proper statutory construction requires
more than a cursory examination of the "plain meaning" of a
statute.
The second principle of statutory construction which is
relevant to the case at bar is that the interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with enforcing the statute is entitled to considerable deference by the judiciary. In Sierra Club
v. Train, 557 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1977), the court affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of a citizen suit brought under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
(FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et. seq. (the citizen suit provision
in the FWPCA is virtually identical to the citizen suit provision in CERCLA) because of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff, like Northwood, did not allege that the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) failed to perform a
nondiscretionary duty. The court was unwilling to find a
mandatory duty for the EPA to either issue a compliance order or institute civil suit upon discovery of a violation despite
the following language in section 309(a)(3) of the FWPCA:
Whenever on the basis of any information available to
him the Administrator finds that any person is in violation ... he shall issue an order requiring such person to
comply with such section or requirement, or he shall
bring a civil action ....

33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) (1972). Once again, the primary issue
was whether the use of "shall" imposed a mandatory duty.
The court held that it did not: "We hold that the duties imposed by section 1319(a)(3) on the EPA are discretionary." Sierra Club, supra, at 491. The court also stated that an
agency's interpretation is permissible unless it contravenes
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol7/iss2/11
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the intent of Congress:
The EPA, as the agency charged with enforcement of the
FWPCA, construes this statute as imposing a discretionary duty, and, in the absence of any cogent argument that
the agency's construction is contrary to congressional intent, the agency's construction will be sustained.
Id. at 489 (emphasis added). Because the legislative history
was unclear, the court deferred to the EPA's interpretation
that section 309(a)(3) of the FWPCA imposed only discretionary duties.
Section 404(s) of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344(s), which is virtually identical to section 309(a)(3) of
the FWPCA, also was interpreted as imposing only discretionary duties on the United States Army Corps of Engineers
("Corps") in Goodyear v. Lecraw, 15 ERC 1189 (S.D. Ga.
1987). The district court in Goodyear also deferred to an
agency interpretation:
[T]he presumption of a mandatory intent created by the
use of "shall" may be overridden by contrary evidence revealed by the purpose of the statute, its legislative history, and the agency's interpretationof the statute.
Id. at 1191 (emphasis added). In that case, private property
owners attempted to compel the Corps to investigate a construction project undertaken by a third party which allegedly
was occurring without a permit. The district court deferred to
the Corps' view that section 404(s) imposes discretionary duties because the legislative history did not show that Congress
intended that 404(s) impose mandatory duties.
The foregoing authority provides two principles of statutory construction that are applicable to the case at hand: 1) a
court should look beyond the "plain meaning" of a statute,
and 2) an agency's interpretation of a statute it enforces is to
be sustained unless the interpretation is contrary to the intent
of Congress. The application of those principles to section
107(f) clearly results in the conclusion that the DOI's duties
under that section are discretionary.
15
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2. The DOI's determination that section 107(f) establishes discretionary duties must be sustained
because that interpretation is not contrary to the
intent of Congress.
The legislative history of section 107(f) of CERCLA does
not reveal a Congressional intent to impose mandatory duties
under that statute. In fact, the legislative history of CERCLA
(exclusive of SARA) is almost completely silent with respect
to the duty of trustees to assess and recover for damage to
natural resources. And, as a general proposition, courts have
recognized that CERCLA was the product of a hurried Congress. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &

Chemical Co., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 823, 838-39 n.15 (W.D. Mo.
1984) ("NEPACCO"). Nonetheless, it does not appear that
the House of Representatives ("House") intended for the
President to act on every allegation of damage to natural
resources:
Damages for, injury to, and destruction of natural resources .

.

. may be claimed only by the President, as

trustee of those natural resources over which the Federal
Government has jurisdiction ....

H.R. Rep. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1980
U.S. Code & Admin. News 6151, 6185 (emphasis added). The
House's use of the word "may," although not conclusive ipso
facto, suggests that the President is not under a mandatory
duty to take action on every damage to natural resources
under the federal trusteeship. However, that language certainly does not impose a mandatory duty.
The legislative history which accompanies SARA is unhelpful because it mirrors the language in section 107(f). The
House Conference Report, in pertinent parts, is as follows:
Senate Amendment -

the President shall designate in

the NCP the Federal officials to act as trustees and to assess natural resource damages ....
House Amendment - the Federal officials designated to

act as trustees under the NCP are to assess natural rehttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol7/iss2/11
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source damages ....
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in
1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3276, 3298. The
House's use of "are to assess" merely reinforces that the trustees are to act to the exclusion of private parties. That language cannot reasonably be construed as imposing a
mandatory duty on the President. The legislative history of
CERCLA and SARA do not include a congressional intent to
impose a mandatory duty on the President to assess every allegation of damage to natural resources.
The DOI has interpreted section 107(f) as establishing
only a discretionary duty to assess damage to natural resources. The DOI regulations (promulgated pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 9651(c)) do not impose a mandatory duty on trustees
of natural resources: "Federal and State agencies who are authorized to act as trustees to natural resources may assess
damages . . . ." DOI Natural Resource Damage Assessments
43 C.F.R. § 11.10 (1986) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the
DOI expressly stated its position in response to a "public
comment" in a statement which accompanied an amendment
to 43 C.F.R. § 11:
Comment: One comment noted that SARA added new
language to CERCLA, at section 107(f)(2)(A) and (B),
which states that State and Federal trustees "shall" assess damage .... The comment interpreted this language
to mean that the assessment of natural resource damage
is now required by trustees as a non-discretionary
duty .

...

Response: The natural resource damage assessment rule
is optional and applies only in those instances where a
trustee chooses to use the process contained in the rule to
conduct an assessment to obtain a rebuttable
presumption.
Amendment of Regulation 11, 53 Fed. Reg. 5169-70 (1988) (to
be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 11) (emphasis added). Clearly, the
DOI interprets sections 107(f)(2) (A) and (B) as merely providing a voluntary mechanism, and not a mandatory duty, for
17
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trustees to obtain a rebuttable presumption of damage assessment accuracy. And, as previously stated, that interpretation
is to be sustained because it is not contrary to the intent of
Congress.
B.

The Majority of Case Law That Has Interpreted
Environmental Statutes Similar to Section 107(f)
Has Not Imposed a Mandatory Duty to Act on
Agencies.

Citizen suit provisions have been construed narrowly
when they are used as a mechanism to compel an agency to
act. Courts are unwilling to substitute the discretion of citizens for that of an administrative agency. In the field of environmental law, this issue has been litigated most frequently
under the FWPCA. Section 309(a)(3) of the FWPCA (set out
supra at p.6) has been the putative basis for many actions by
citizens attempting to compel action by the EPA. Under a
clear majority view, section 309(a)(3) has been interpreted as
establishing a discretionary duty on the EPA.
In Dubois v. Thomas, 820 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1987), the
majority rule recently was affirmed. In that case, the trial
court ruled that: 1) the EPA is under a mandatory duty to
investigate whenever presented with an assertion by a citizen
that a violation has occurred, and 2) that the EPA has a
mandatory duty to take action on the findings from the investigation. The court of appeals reversed both rulings of the district court. First, the court stated that it would be impracticable to force the EPA to follow up on every citizen complaint:
[T]he EPA could be compelled to expend its limited resources investigating multitudinous complaints, irrespective of the magnitude of their environmental significance
...Only if the Administrator has discretion to allocate
its own resources can a rational enforcement approach
be achieved.
Id. at 948 (emphasis added). Next, the court held that an
agency's decision not to enforce a statute is to be sustained
unless it controverts the intent of Congress:
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol7/iss2/11
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We believe that neither the language of section 309(a)(3)
nor its legislative history can be said to evince a clear intent of Congress as to whether the enforcement duties of
the Administrator are mandatory or discretionary. Under
such circumstances, the Administrator's interpretation is
a permissible construction of section 309(a)(3).
Id. at 950. Thus, Dubois, like Sierra Club (discussed supra, at
6), is authority that section 309(a)(3), which states that the
Administrator "shall" issue a compliance order or bring civil
action, imposes only a discretionary duty on the EPA.
Similarly, the use of "shall" in section 113 of the Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413, has been interpreted as imposing
only discretionary duties on the EPA. In City of Seabrook v.
Costle, 659 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1981), Seabrook brought action
under a citizen suit provision to compel the EPA to notify
persons that they were in violation of the Clean Air Act. Seabrook contended that notification was a mandatory duty of
the EPA under section 113(a):
Whenever, on the basis of any information available to
him, the Administrator finds that any person is in violation ... the Administrator shall notify the person in violation ...
42 U.S.C. § 7413(a) (emphasis added). The court held that the
duty to notify was not mandatory, and, in support of its holding, reasoned that an agency's discretion should not be replaced by the will of citizens: "The enforcement agencies are
duty bound to allocate those resources as they perceive, not
in the causes deemed most important by individual citizens."
Seabrook, 659 F.2d 1371, 1374 (emphasis added).
The interpretation of section 107(f) of CERCLA is a
question of first impression. Case law interpreting the
FWPCA and the Clean Air Act have construed strictly the
ability of citizens to compel action by administrative agencies.
This court should follow that lead and affirm the trial court's
ruling that CERCLA does not impose on federal trustees a
mandatory duty to act on every allegation of damage to natural resources.

[ill
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II. THE DOI'S DECISION NOT TO TAKE ACTION IS
AN ENFORCEMENT DECISION THAT IS NOT REVIEWABLE BY THE JUDICIARY.
A. An Agency Decision Not to Take Action Is Presumptively Unreviewable and That Presumption
Only May be Rebutted by Specific Guidelines Intended by Congress to Circumscribe the Agency's
Discretion.
A decision not to take action by an agency charged with
the enforcement of a statute is reviewable only under limited
circumstances. Congress precluded judicial review of certain
agency decisions when it passed the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1982). In Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), the Supreme Court determined the
reviewability of agency decisions not to take action under the
APA. In Chaney, a group of death row inmates brought an
action to compel the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
prevent the use of certain drugs for lethal injections. The
FDA refused to act on the inmates demands. The Supreme
Court ruled that the APA created a presumption of non-reviewability for agency decisions not to take action: "an
agency's decision not to take action should be presumed immune from judicial review under section 701(a)(2)." Chaney,
supra, at 832. The Supreme Court then described the narrow
circumstances under which the presumption can be rebutted.
Congress may rebut the presumption only:
[I]f it has indicated an intent to circumscribe agency enforcement discretion, and has provided meaningful standards for defining the limits of that discretion, there is
"law to apply" under section 701(a)(2), and courts may
require that the agency follow that law; if it has not, then
an agency refusal to institute proceedings is a decision
"committed to agency discretion by law."
Chaney, supra, at 834-35 (emphasis added). The inmates in
Chaney argued that Congress intended to limit the FDA's discretion by forcing prosecution in all cases because the relevant
statute stated that violators "shall be imprisoned." Id. at 835.
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol7/iss2/11
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However, the Supreme Court held that language was insufficient to rebut the presumption of non-reviewability.
In Harmon Cove Condominium Association v. Marsh,
815 F.2d 949 (3rd Cir. 1987), a condominium association attempted to compel the Corps to force compliance by a third
party developer with the conditions of a permit the developer
was issued and was allegedly in violation of. The association
argued that section 404(s) of the FWPCA (discussed supra at
p. 7) limited the Secretary's discretion because the provision
required the issuance of a compliance order or the filing of a
civil action upon discovery of a violation. The court of appeals
upheld the district court's denial of relief because section 404
did not constitute sufficient guidelines to rebut the presumption of non-reviewability:
The statute imposes no duty on the Secretary to make a
finding of violation, because it contains no guidelines for
the Secretary to follow in choosing to initiate enforcement activity.
Harmon Cove, supra, at 953 (emphasis added). The holding in
Harmon Cove clearly suggests that only specific guidelines
will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of non-reviewability set out in Chaney.
Under Chaney and Harmon Cove, an agency's decision
not to take enforcement action is unreviewable unless Congress specifically circumscribes the agency's discretion. The
application of that rule to the case at hand results in the conclusion that the DOI's decision not to assess the alleged damage to the Northwood National Wildlife Refuge is beyond judicial review.
B.

The DOI's Discretion Was Not Circumscribed by
Congress in CERCLA and Therefore Its Decision
Not to Take Action Is Not Reviewable by This
Court.

Neither CERCLA nor SARA provide enforcement guidelines sufficient to rebut the presumption of non-reviewability
of agency inaction. Section 107(f)(1) merely states that "The
[13]
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President . . . shall act . . . as trustee." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f).
Obviously, that language does not provide any guidelines for
the DOI. Although section 107(f)(2) is more specific, that section is also insufficient to limit the DOI's discretion. Section
107(f)(2)(A), in pertinent parts, is as follows:
The President shall designate . . .officials who shall act
on behalf of the public as trustees ....Such officials shall
assess damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources ... for those resources under their trusteeship ....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(A). First of all, that language does not
provide guidelines in regard to: 1) when an assessment should
or should not be performed, 2) how an assessment should be
performed, or 3) what constitutes injury to, destruction of, or
loss of natural resources. Those questions were specifically left
unanswered by Congress and left to the discretion of the executive branch because Congress authorized the President to
promulgate regulations to enforce section 107(f) under section
301(c) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c).
Second, Congress expressly limited the DOI's ability to
perform damage assessments when, under SARA, it revoked
the ability of the DOI to be reimbursed under the Superfund
for the cost of those assessments. In part V of SARA, Congress expressly prohibited the use of the Superfund for natural resource claims by trustees:
Amounts of the Superfund shall be available, as provided
in the appropriations Act, only for purposes of making expenditures ....
(ii) Section 111(c) of CERCLA (as so in effect) other
than paragraphs(1) and (2) thereof ....

I.R.C. § 9507(c) (emphasis added). Paragraphs (1) and (2)
of section 111(c) respectively authorized the use of the
Superfund for the costs of assessing damages to natural resources, and the costs of restoring, rehabilitating, or replacing
natural resources. Thus, SARA effectively forces the DOI to
pay for the cost of assessments in the first instance and there
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol7/iss2/11
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is no reimbursement unless the DOI is able to recover from a
responsible party. (See also Withdrawal of Natural Resource
Claims Procedure 40 C.F.R. § 306, 52 Fed. Reg. 51,169, which
explains how SARA makes the Superfund unavailable to the
DOI). Because the Superfund is now "off limits" to the DOI,
Congress would have imposed an incredible burden on the
DOI if it intended for the DOI to assess damage to natural
resources, pursuant to section 107(f)(2)(A), upon demand
from private citizens. It strains credulity to find that Congress
intended to impose such a burden on the DOI when, at the
same time, Congress revoked the DOI's ability to be reimbursed under the Superfund for natural resource damage
assessments.
Third, Congress imposed specific deadlines on the executive branch action under CERCLA when it intended to impose a mandatory duty. For example, section 301(c) of CERCLA required the President to promulgate regulations within
six months after SARA was enacted. Similarly, section 120(e)
requires federal agencies to conduct a remedial investigation
and feasibility study within six months of the inclusion of an
agency facility on the National Priorities List. The absence of
a deadline for executive response under section 107(f)(2)(A)
further supports the DOI interpretation that no mandatory
duty is imposed under that section.
Finally, Congress intended for section 107(f)(2)(A) to create a mechanism for trustees to obtain a rebuttable presumption of assessment accuracy (this argument is set out in detail
supra, at 9-10). Thus, Congress created an optional mechanism rather than a mandatory procedure under section
107(f)(2)(A). The language in that section was not intended to
act and is insufficient to act as guidelines for the DOI to follow in the enforcement of CERCLA. Accordingly, the DOI's
decision not to act on Northwood's allegations is outside of
the scope of judicial review.
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III. THE CITY OF NORTHWOOD'S RELIANCE ON THE
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IS WITHOUT MERIT
BECAUSE CONGRESS DID NOT INTEND TO INVOKE THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE WHEN IT
PASSED CERCLA.
The district court rejected Northwood's argument that
Congress intended to invoke the public trust doctrine when it
used the words "trust" and "trustee." Opn. at 5. That doctrine certainly is too amorphous to be codified into CERCLA
by the use of "trust" or "trustee." Furthermore, the legislative
history accompanying CERCLA does not include a Congressional intent to invoke that doctrine.
One commentator has argued that Congress considered
the public trust doctrine when it drafted CERCLA:
The overlap can be traced to the original Senate CERCLA bill, which stated that the purpose of natural resource damage liability was "to preserve the public trust
in the Nation's natural resources .... "
Miller, Making CERCLA Natural Resource Damage Resources Work: Use of the Public Trust Doctrine and Other
State Remedies, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,299 (August 1988), quoting from S. Rep. No. 96-848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1980)
(emphasis added). However, the reference to the preservation
of the "public trust" should be read as the statement of Congress' goal to preserve the public confidence in natural resources and not as evidence of a Congressional intent to invoke the public trust doctrine. Congress would have explicitly
commented about the public trust doctrine and its previous
application by the judiciary if it had intended to incorporate
that doctrine into CERCLA.
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IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
THE CITY OF NORTHWOOD'S CLAIM FOR DAMAGES FOR INJURY TO NATURAL RESOURCES
UNDER THEIR MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL.
Section 107(a)(4)(C) of CERCLA provides in relevant
part that generators of hazardous wastes are liable for "damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,
including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss ....

."

42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C). CERCLA

defines "natural resources" as:
land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such resources belonging to,
managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the United States
local government ....

....

any State or

42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (emphasis added). Under this definition,
both the Wildlife Refuge and the aquifer that is hydrologically connected to the wetlands and marshes within the refuge, are "natural resources" because they are under the management and control of the city. Thus, damages for injury to
them, including the cost of assessing such injury, may properly be recovered in an action under CERCLA.
The district court, however, relying on an overly literal
interpretation of CERCLA, ruled that the city was not a
proper plaintiff under section 107(f) and dismissed the complaint. Section 107(f) provides in pertinent part that:
in the case of an injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources under subparagraph (C) of subsection (a) of
this section liability shall be to the United States Government and to any State ....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(f). Rejecting two recent court decisions allowing cities to prosecute claims for damages to natural resources, as well as substantial legislative history to the same
effect, the court based its decision on an overly rigid application of the "plain meaning" rule, stating that "to my reading,
25
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'state' means 'state,' not 'state and city.' There is no need to
look to the legislative history. If Congress meant to include
cities it could have done so." Opn. at p.5.
A. The Definition of State Should be Liberally Construed to Include Local Governments in Order to Effectuate the Broad Remedial Purpose of CERCLA.
While it is true that all statutory construction must begin
with the language of the statute itself, Touche Ross v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), the plain meaning rule is not a rule
of law and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 1673 (1981). As one
court put it, the "[m]ere incantation of the plain meaning rule
S.. cannot substitute for meaningful analysis." Shippers National Freight Claim Council v. I.C.C., 712 F.2d 740, 747 (2d
Cir. 1983). Furthermore, "the plain meaning doctrine has always been considered subservient to a truly discernible legislative purpose." Aviation Consumer Action Project v. Washburn, 535 F.2d 101, 106 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Here, as will be
shown, the legislative history surrounding the enactment of
CERCLA and especially SARA indicates Congressional intent
that municipalities be allowed to act as natural resource trustees and sue for injuries to natural resources under their management and control.
As previously noted, Congress provided that liability for
damage to natural resources shall be to the United States and
any State. 42 U.S.C. § 9707(f). These two terms are defined to
include:
the several states of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, and any other
territory or possession over which the United States has
jurisdiction.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(27). The fact that Congress chose to use the
term "includes" rather than "means" in defining these terms
evinces a legislative intent that the list was to be considered
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol7/iss2/11
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illustrative rather than exclusive, and therefore susceptible to
expansion. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority v.
I.C.C., 645 F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In two recent cases considering the issue presented here, courts applied this reasoning to conclude that the statutory provision in question allows
municipalities to serve as natural resource trustees under
CERCLA. Mayor of Boonton v. Drew Chemical Corp., 621 F.
Supp. 663 (D.N.J. 1985); City of New York v. Exxon Corp.,
633 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). In so concluding, one court
stated that "[tihe definitional section in question explicitly
contemplates an expansion of the illustrative list to the fullest
extent where to do so would be consistent with the remedial
intent of the act." Mayor of Boonton v. Drew Chemical Corp.,
621 F. Supp. 633, 666 (D.N.J. 1985) (citing Winterrowd v.
David Freedman and Co., Inc., 724 F.2d 823, 825 (9th Cir.
1984)). It is especially appropriate to expansively construe the
provision in question in a situation such as here where the
statute is "hardly a paradigm of clarity or precision." 1 City of
Philadelphiav. Stepan Chemical Co., 713 F. Supp. 1484, 1488
n. 11 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (citing Artesian Water Co. v. Gov't of
New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d Cir. 1988)). Furthermore, because CERCLA is essentially a remedial statute
designed to protect and preserve public health and the environment, [courts] are therefore obligated to construe its provisions liberally to avoid frustration of the beneficial legislative
purposes. City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 697 F. Supp. 677,
685 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (quoting Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986)'
(concluding that defining "state" to include municipalities
would most effectively advance the Act's remedial purpose)).
It is the totality of these circumstances that led each of the
only two courts dealing with the precise issue presented here
to conclude that cities could in fact act as natural resource
1. The deficiencies in the drafting of CERCLA are well documented. In fact, one
of the leading cases on the interpretation of the Act has stated that CERCLA is "a
hastily drawn piece of compromise legislation, marred by vague terminology and deleted provisions .... thus placing courts "in the undesirable and onerous position of
construing inadequately drawn legislation." NEPACCO, supra, 579 F. Supp. at 838839 n.15.
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trustees and bring an action for damages to natural resources
that are under their management and control.
In Mayor of Boonton v. Drew Chemical Corp., 621 F.
Supp. 663, a local government brought an action seeking recovery for damages to natural resources caused by the defendant's dumping of hazardous wastes. In moving for summary
judgment, the defendant argued, as defendant here argues,
that the city was not the proper plaintiff, inasmuch as cities
are not expressly included in the definition of "State." Id. at
666. The court rejected this argument, first noting the distinction between statutory definitions that use "include" rather
than "means," and then reasoning that it was therefore proper
to give an expansive interpretation to the definition of the
term state in order to effectuate the broad remedial purpose
of CERCLA. Id. As further support for its decision, the court
noted that while liability for damages to natural resources is
to the United States and any state under section 107(f), the
act includes in its definition of natural resources those resources "belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by . . . any State or local
government." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (emphasis added). The
court then concluded that:
[i]t should be anomalous for this far reaching remedial
statute to give states a cause of action for damages to natural resources owned by the State but for it to exclude
cities from access to such a cause of action while expressly
including resources owned by "local governments" within
the scope of the protected subject of 9607(a)(4)(C).
Mayor of Boonton, supra, 621 F. Supp. at 666. Therefore, reasoning that CERCLA should be given a broad and liberal construction, the court concluded that municipalities are within
the group of entities on whom Congress conferred standing to
sue for damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural
resources under CERCLA.
The only other court to address this issue in a reported
opinion, City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F. Supp. 609,
also reached the same result. In Exxon, the city of New York
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol7/iss2/11
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brought an action under CERCLA against certain generators
and transporters of hazardous wastes for damages to natural
resources under its management and control. Id. at 618. The
city alleged that the defendants had dumped the wastes into
certain landfills owned and operated by the city. It further alleged that the wastes had contaminated ground water at each
of the landfills and leached into surface waters surrounding
the landfills, thus threatening aquifers which constituted either present or potential sources of drinking water for. the
city's residents. Id. at 613.
The defendants moved to dismiss the action for failure to
state a claim on which relief could be granted, arguing, as did
the defendants in Boonton and the defendants here, that
under section 107(f) they could not be liable to the city for
damages for injury to natural resources, but rather could be
liable only to the Federal Government or to the State for such
damages. Id. at 618-619. The Exxon court also rejected that
argument, noting that such an argument "depends upon an
overly literal reading of 107(f)," and that to follow such an
approach "would be to disregard Judge Learned Hand's advice 'not to make a fortress out of the dictionary . . . .'" City
of New York v. Exxon, supra, 633 F. Supp. at 619 (quoting
Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1945)).
The court then opined that because CERCLA defines
natural resources to include those resources managed or controlled by local governments, to prevent such local governments from prosecuting claims for damages to those resources
under their control would defeat the manifest purpose of
CERCLA. Emphasizing the broad remedial nature of CERCLA, the court concluded its analysis by stating:
[T]he Act's broad remedial intention is not furthered by a
reading which requires the State, which is not the government charged with managing and conserving those resources, to bring suit to recover for damage done to them.
The clear purpose of the Act, which is to ensure prompt
and effective cleanup of hazardous wastes and the restoration of environmental quality, is not advanced by
preventing the authorities entrusted with the management of public resources from bringing actions to recover
29
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the cost of protecting them.

City of New York v. Exxon, supra, 633 F. Supp. at 619 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, a local government is the logical
party to bring suits for damage to natural resources. After all,
it is the City that is most closely related to the natural resources under their control. This is especially true in situations such as the one presented here, where the natural resources are "an important aesthetic and recreational resource
to the City of Northwood." (R. 2.)
The district court's interpretation barring the City from
proceeding on its own behalf creates the undesirable result of
pitting states and local governments against one another. As
an example of the absurd result that could occur under the
court's decision, imagine that an invaluable natural resource,
such as a city's entire drinking water supply, is threatened
with destruction due to the dumping of hazardous wastes. The
State, for whatever reason, decides that it is unable, or unwilling, to bring an action for damages for the injury to the natural resources. Applying the district court's decision to these
facts, the City's only alternative is to pay for the clean-up out
of its own already strained coffers, thus giving the toxic polluter an unintended windfall. Clearly, this result was not intended by Congress in enacting CERCLA, and would fail to
accomplish one of the preliminary purposes of CERCLA - to
ensure that those responsible for environmental harm bear
the cost of remedying the harm they created.
B.

The Same Facts That Led the Boonton and Exxon
Courts to Conclude That Municipalities Can Prosecute Claims for Damages for Injury to Natural Resources Are Present in the Instant Case.
The district court in the case at bar rejected, with little or
no analysis, the reasoning in both Boonton and Exxon, stating
that "[I] think these cases are either distinguishable or were
wrongly decided." Opn. at p. 6. As the following discussion
will show, the facts of the present case are extremely similar
to the facts in both Boonton and Exxon. Furthermore, the
reasoning employed in both cases applies with equal force to
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol7/iss2/11
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the facts presented in the case at bar.
As in both cases discussed above, the present action involves a local government, in this case a city, bringing an action on its own behalf seeking damages for injury to natural
resources under its management and control. In this case, the
natural resources in question consist of a wildlife refuge, completely enclosed within the city's municipal boundaries, and
an aquifer containing ground water believed to flow from the
defendant's plant, underneath a number of homes in the city,
and onward to the refuge, where it is believed to be hydrologically connected to the wetlands and marshes in the refuge. (R.
2). These facts are very similar to the facts presented in Exxon. In Exxon, the natural resources in question consisted, inter alia, of ground water serving as either a present or potential source of drinking water for the city's residents. Exxon,
633 F. Supp. at 618. Here, potential sources of drinking water
for city residents are also affected, as evidenced by the fact
that the City was forced to close several wells that had been
providing drinking water to a number of homes near the refuge. Also, in Exxon, the surface waters of Jamaica Bay, Eastchester Bay, and Richmond Creek were affected. Here, too,
the surface waters of the refuge, as well as the refuge as a
whole, are affected. While it is not clear from the record in
Exxon who owned the surface waters, the court did state that
all of the natural resources were managed or controlled by the
city. Id. at 633. Likewise, here, the natural resources are either
managed or controlled by the city.
Management and control are defined, respectively, as
"the act of managing by direction of regulation . . ." and the
"power or authority to manage, direct, . . . regulate, govern,
administer or oversee." Black's Law Dictionary 298, 865 (5th
ed. 1979). Under these definitions, there can be no doubt but
that the City of Northwood manages or controls both the
wildlife refuge and the aquifer. With regard to the refuge, the
city's municipal ordinances apply just as readily within the
refuge as without. In addition, the City provides utility services such as fire protection and trash removal. The fact that
the refuge is owned by the Federal Government is of little import, for while it is true that CERCLA defines natural re31
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sources to include resources owned by any state or local government, the definition also includes those resources
"managed by," "appertaining to," "or otherwise controlled
by" any state or local government. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16).
Therefore, ownership of the natural resources at issue is not a
prerequisite to bringing an action for damages to those resources. As far as aquifer and potential drinking water supplies are concerned, these are even more clearly under the
management and control of the City. It is the City that decides which houses are to be connected to the supply, and it is
the city's health department which tests the quality of the
water to detect the presence of unwanted chemicals and
wastes such as the hazardous substances involved here. Furthermore, the aquifer, and the ground water contained in it,
are both "appertaining to" the City. Appertain is defined as,
inter alia, to be appurtenant to. Black's Law Dictionary 94
(5th ed. 1979).
A thing is deemed to be ... appurtenantto land when it
is by right used with the land for its benefit, as in the case
of a way, or water-course ....
Black's Law Dictionary 94 (5th ed. 1979). Applying this definition to the facts of the instant case, it is clear that the aquifer and the ground water in it both appertain to and are appurtenant to the City of Northwood. Therefore, the City
should be allowed to proceed with its claim for damages to
natural resources "appertaining to" the City. 42 U.S.C. §§
9601(16), 9607(a)(4)(C).
C.

The District Court's Reliance on Stepan Chemical Is
Misplaced.

The district court stated that it found support for its interpretation of section 101(16) in City of Philadelphiav. Stepan Chem. Co., 713 F. Supp. 1484 (E.D. Pa. 1989). But a close
review of this case reveals that while the court did refuse to
construe section 107(a)(4)(A) to allow a municipality to proceed as a state, Stepan Chem. Co., 713 F. Supp. at 1488, the
court expressly declined to decide whether a city could bring
[24]
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an action in its own right to recover for damages to natural
resources under 107(a)(4)(C). Id. at 1489 n.16. The distinction
between suits brought under section 107(a)(4)(A) and those
brought pursuant to section 107(a)(4)(C) is crucial. If a city is
prevented from bringing suit as a state under section
107(a)(4)(A), it still is able to bring suit in its own right under
the "any person" 2 provision of section 107(a)(4)(B). The only
drawback is that the City must, as an element of its prima
facie case, show that the suit is consistent with the national
contingency plan, whereas under section 107(a)(4)(A), the
burden is on the defendant to show that the suit is inconsistent with the national contingency plan. Stepan Chem., 713 F.
Supp. at 1488. Therefore, the detriment to the City is minimal, even if it is prevented from bringing suit under section
107(a)(4)(A). Also, the effect on the remedial purpose of CERCLA, to clean up toxic pollution, is likewise de minimus.
On the other hand, because there is no parallel private
action for damages to natural resources, if a city is barred
from prosecuting a claim in its own right, it is left with nothing to do but hope that the federal government or the state
will decide to bring an action as natural resource trustee.
Given the fact that the hazardous waste problem is reaching
near epidemic proportions,3 coupled with the ever increasing
budgetary problems facing both federal and state governments today, there appears little hope that such suits will be
brought with any regularity. It is therefore imperative that local governments be given the right to prosecute claims for
natural resource damages in their own right, or the clearly
manifested intent of Congress in enacting CERCLA and
SARA will be defeated.
D.

Congress Explicitly Acquiesced in the Interpretation of CERCLA Allowing Local Governments to

2. Under CERCLA, states are explicitly included in the definition of "any person." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
3. The near crisis condition of today's environment is evidenced by the fact that

today there are nearly 1,000 toxic sites on the national priority list, and the list continues to grow at a rate far greater than the resources being committed to solve this
problem.

[25]
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Sue for Recovery for Injuries to Natural Resources.
Under general rules of statutory construction, Congress is
deemed to be aware of the judicial interpretation given to certain statutory provisions, and is considered to have adopted
that interpretation when it reenacts the statute without
change. James v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1983). With
respect to the interpretation of CERCLA allowing local governments to bring claims for damages to natural resources,
not only should Congress be deemed to have been aware of
the decisions in Boonton and Exxon, but there is substantial
evidence in the Congressional Record indicating that Congress
was actually aware of these decisions when it enacted SARA.
Both opinions had been rendered prior to the passage of
SARA. In fact, during the floor debate leading to SARA's passage, one of the bill's sponsors expressly stated on the record
that the final version of the bill would uphold the Boonton
decision. Senator Lautenberg, one of the bill's sponsors and a
member of the Conference Committee, stated that "these provisions would uphold the Boonton decision allowing municipalities to sue for cost recovery under the same Superfund
provisions available to the states, and to serve as trustees for
natural resource damages." 135 Cong. Rec. S14912 (daily ed.
Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). He further
stated that this would "permit communities to move ahead
with clean-up plans on their own." Id. While it is true that the
comments of one senator generally cannot be attributed to the
legislature as a whole, it is equally true that statements made
by the legislation's sponsor deserve to be accorded substantial
weight in interpreting the statute in question. FederalEnergy
Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976). These
facts lead to the inescapable conclusion that Congress intended to leave intact the decisions in Boonton and Exxon
allowing municipalities to sue for damages to natural
resources.
Further support for the position that Congress tacitly approved of the Boonton and Exxon decisions is found in the
legislative history accompanying the passage of SARA. The
House of Representatives' version of SARA amended the defihttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol7/iss2/11
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nition of state to specifically exclude units of local governments. H.R. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). But the Senate
version, the one ultimately enacted into law, did not contain
this new definition. Id. In explaining the deletion, the Joint
Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference
stated that "[t]he conference substitute does not include the
House amendment to the definition of 'State' leaving it to the
court's interpretation of this provision." Id.
While the rejection of proposed legislation ordinarily does
not conclusively establish legislative intent, the rejection of a
specific provision can be particularly significant. Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 96 (1935); People for Envtl. Progress v. Leisz, 768 F.2d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding
that the explicit rejection of a proposed amendment to FIFRA
authorizing private suits is a strong indication that Congress
was opposed to private suits under FIFRA); G.A.O. v. G.A.O.
Personnel App. Bd., 698 F.2d 516, 525 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (concluding that Congress' rejection of proposed legislation making judicial review unavailable strongly suggests that Congress
intended that judicial review be available).
From this, it is logical to conclude that by its explicit rejection of the amendment to the definition of state to exclude
local governments, Congress manifested an intent that local
governments be included within this definition.
E.

The District Court Placed Too Much Emphasis on
the Fact That the Governor of New Union Declined
to Designate the City of Northwood a Trustee for
the Natural Resources in Northwood.

In its opinion, the district court seemed to place unnecessary emphasis on the fact that the Governor of New Union
refused the Mayor of Northwood's request to be designated a
trustee over the natural resources in Northwood. Section
107(f)(2)(B) provides that "[tihe Governor of each state shall
designate State officials who may act on behalf of the public
as trustees for natural resources ... under their trusteeship."
42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(B) (emphasis added). While there is no
reported case interpreting this provision, one commentator
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has taken the position that the language is nothing more than
an action-forcing mechanism designed to clarify which State
officials may act as trustees for natural resources under the
State's control. Maraziti, Local Governments: Opportunities
to Recover for Natural Resource Damages, 17 Envtl. L. Rep.
10,036 (Feb. 1987) (emphasis added). This has little effect on
the conclusion that municipalities are able to act as trustees
in their own right. To conclude, as the district court apparently did, that the designation of state officials as natural resource trustees bars municipal governments from acting as
trustees for resources under their control, leads to exactly the
type of anomalous result foreseen by the courts in both Boonton and Exxon. For under this reasoning, local governments,
the very entities charged with management and control of the
natural resources, are prohibited from bringing actions to recover the cost of protecting them. City of New York v. Exxon
Corp., supra, 633 F. Supp. at 619. This not only seems illogical, but goes a long way toward frustrating the broad remedial
intention of CERCLA.
CONCLUSION
The DOI is every bit as interested in seeing that natural
resources are protected, and injury to them compensated for,
as the City of Northwood. In fact, in the perfect world, the
DOI would be more than willing to respond to every possible
threat posed to these precious resources. Unfortunately, in today's world of trillion dollar national deficits, and the resulting budget cuts being foisted on public agencies, there is only
so much one agency can do. Unfortunate is the reality that,
while budgets are shrinking, the crisis facing our environment
due to hazardous wastes is increasing exponentially.
While to local governments and other private parties,
nothing may appear more urgent than the hazardous substance problem in its own backyard, the fact is that the severity of problems vary to some degree. Giving private parties
the right to force the federal government to respond to any
natural resource problem, regardless of its severity, is not only
contrary to legislative intent, but constitutes an enormous
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol7/iss2/11
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waste of increasingly limited resources.
The DOI submits that a far better solution to this national problem, indeed one implicitly endorsed by the legislature, is to allow those on the front lines of the problem to
wage the battle themselves by allowing local municipalities to
sue for damage to natural resources under their management
and control. By granting local governments this power, the
federal government would be free to devote its resources to
areas of broader concern, while local governments would be
able to make decisions based on what is best for them. After
all, it seems more logical to allow those most closely affected
by the problem to make the enforcement decisions affecting
those resources under their control.
In interpreting CERCLA, courts must always be mindful
that the overriding purpose sought to be accomplished is the
clean-up of hazardous substances in the environment. Thus
any interpretation that would further this broad remedial
goal, without doing violence to the statute itself, should be encouraged. It is just this rationale that led the only two courts
publishing on this issue to conclude that municipalities could.
in fact act as trustees for natural resources under their management and control. And it is this same rationale that should
lead this court to the identical conclusion.
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